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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STA.TE OF UTAH

,V. P. HARLIN CONSTRUCTION 1
COMP ANY, a- Utah corporation,
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,

\.C~~~~o

vs.
UTAH STATE ROAD COM~IIS
SION
'
Defendant and Respondent.

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action involves three different claims by the
General Contractor, W. P. Harlin Construction Company, appellant, against the Utah State Road Commission, respondent, for three separate breaches of contract, which contracts involve the construction of
portions of Interstate 15 projects.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
By a Pre-Trial Order (R. 70, 71), the Pre-Tria.
Judge, the Honorable A. If. Ellett, dismissed the First
Cause of Action, and set up issues on the Second and
Third Causes of Action. The First Cause of Action
relates to the respondent's refusal to permit appellant
to use appellant's combustion type Del .Mag pile drirrng hammer.
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (R. 7381) and to Amend the Pre-Trial Order, was denied
by the Pre-Trial Judge. ( R. 86) . A Petition for Intermediate Appeal was denied by this Supreme Court.
Appellant, on October 18, 1966, filed its .Motion
to Amend Pre-Trial Order and to Permit Trial of the
First Cause of Action. ( R. 90) . These Motions were
to be argued at the beginning of the trial. These Motions also sought permission to make a proffer of proof
on the First Cause of Action.
These l\fotions were argued prior to trial and were
denied by the trial court. The Second and Third Causes
of Action were thereupon tried to a jury, a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff in the full amounts on both
causes was rendered, and judgment entered accord·
ingly and satisfied. Said judgment also dismissed the
First Cause of Action, denied appellants' Motion to
Amend the Pre-Trial Order, to Permit the First Cause
of Action to be tried, and to make a proffer of proof;
and, said judgment also affirmed the Pre-Trial Order.
(R. 127, 128).
2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant herein seeks reversal of the dismissal
of the First Cause of Action, and a remand to the District Court for trial of the issues in the First Cause of
Action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as appellant's First Cause of Action was
dismissed as a matter of law by the Pre-Trial Judge
and the trial court denied appellant the right to make
a proffer of proof, there is no evidence to support any
facts. Therefore, the facts set forth herein should be
accepted as alleged in the plaintiffs' various pleadings,
and considered m a light most favorable to plaintiffappellant.
The facts set forth herein, therefore, are taken
for the most part from the pleadings. A more complete
factual picture is shown in the various Motions and
affi<lavits. (R. 53, 51, 65, 73, 82), but obviously much
detailed evidence to support the ultimate facts would
only be developed at trial or upon proffer of proof.
Harlin, appellant herein, entered into a contract
for the construction of Interstate 15 overpass structures at 2nd South and 8th \Vest Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah. (R. 1). Pilings had to be driven to support
the foundations for these overpass structures. The
methods of driving the pilings, as well as the type of
pile driving hammer allowed are set forth in certain
specifications. (R. 7, 9).
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The special provisions of the specifications modified,
the general condition by establishing the minimum
energy rating of 18,000-foot pounds per blow.
'

The general conditions provided that a cumbustion'
type hammer could be used. This proviso is stated, as
follows:

"Combustion-type pile hammers may be used '
in lieu of air or steam hammers; providing a
rating (energy per blow) mutually agreed upon
by the Contractor and the Chief Structural En·
gineer is established prior to use."
Appellant owned a combustion-type hammer
known as a Del l\iag D-12, with a rating in excess of
18,000-foot pounds per blow and which complied with
specifications in every respect. The appellant entered
into the contract and submitted its bid in reliance upon
the specifications and upon the contemplated use of
this D-12 Hammer on the project. (R. 9, 10). The
respondent refused to permit the use of the D-12 Hammer, thus requiring appellant to obtain a much larger
combustion-type hammer at additional cost. Appellant
thereupon claimed in its Complaint (R. 9), in its claims
at the Pre-Trial (R. 70, 71), and in its Motion for
Reconsideration (R. 73-81), as follows:
1. That it submitted its bid and was awarded
the contract in reliance upon the said specification
and upon its use of the D-12 Hammer in accordance therewith.

2. That the hammer did have more than the
4
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minimum rating of 18,000-foot pounds per blow,
and that it complied with and could comply with
the specifications relating to pile driving.
3. That it further relied upon the fact that the
State, under identical specifications for the construction of Interstate structures at 21st South
Street immediately prior to the subject contract,
had agreed to the rating of the D-12 Hammer, had
permitted and accepted its use throughout said
project through the same Structural Engineer as
was employed upon the subject project, and with
a Contractor, Tolboe & Harlin Construction Company, in which the same W. P. Harlin was a partner and involved in the pile driving work on the
project and with which the plaintiff was in privity;
that the State knew that appellant would use and
had anticipated using the same D-12 Hammer on
the subject project, but had made no complaint
as to its use nor change in the specifications until
after the project had storted.
4. That the State breached the contract by

arbitrarily, unreasonably and without any cause
refusing to agree to the use of the hammer even
though the hammer complied in all respect with
the specifications and could readily have performed
the required work.
5. That the State arbitrarily disregarded the

energy rating requirement of the aforesaid specification, and required appellant to submit its D-12

5

Hammer to a test entirely beyond and unrelated
to the requirements of the specifications, which test .
was inadequate, inconclusive, incompetent and '
incorrect as a basis for refusing the use of the D-12
Hammer, and which test still showed that the D-19• !I
Hammer did comply with the specifications, and
that this was a breach of the contract.
1

1

6. That had a proper test been made, the D-12
Hammer would have been shown to comply with
the specifications; and, that as a matter of fact, I
the same D -12 Hammer was permitted to be used :
after the test, back on the same 21st South project '
on which it had been originally used.

7. That the State was equitably estopped from
ref using to accept the hammer and had waived its '
right to reject the hammer.
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint and the
Answer, various Interrogatories and Answers thereto
were filed; ( R. 27, 142, 146, 44) depositions were
taken (R. 39, 43) and various Motions filed and denied
(R. 13, 14) until the matter came on for Pre-Trial
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett.
The Pre-Trial Order was entered m which the
Court summarily and incompletely stated claims of the
plaintiff (R. 70, 71), and then held as a matter of law:
"That the plaintiff is not entitled to recover on
the First Cause of Action and that the claims of
the plaintiff as to arbitrariness in ref using t.o
agree on the rating of the hammer is not suff1·
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cient to permit the plaintiff to recover even
though the hammer may have had 22,500-foot
pounds of energy."

l2 i The Court further stated, on the question of arbitraril2 i ness, that:
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"In Interrogatory No. 3 of Set 2, the plaintiff
admits that it had nothing to show by way of
arbitrariness of the defendant in refusing to
agree on the rating of the hammer, except that
the hammer had been used on another job py
partners, one of which is the chief stockholder
of the plaintiff corporation."

Thereafter, appellant filed its Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that the Pre-Trial Order would
m · result in manifest injustice and seeking to amend the
ts ~ Pre-Trial Order in order to submit the matter to the
trier of the facts. (R. 73-81). This Motion was denied
1e
without hearing by a minute entry, dated July 26,
to
1966, (R. 73), and thereafter by a formal Order, signed
re
September 1, 1966. (R. 86).
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A Demand for Jury Trial was filed and appellant
filed its Motion to Amend Pre-Trial Order and to Permit Trial of the First Cause of Action. (R. 90, 91).
These Motions, including therein appellant's motion to
make a proffer of proof, were denied just prior to the
trial. (R. 127-129). Jury trial on the other two causes
was had. This appeal is thereupon taken from Judgment denying Trial of First Cause.

i·
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING
PRE - TRIAL ORDER DIS.MISSING
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACT]

A. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ES
LISHING AS ISSUES OF FACT AN1
LAW THE DEFENDANT'S ALLE
BREACH OF THE CONTRACT.

The Pre-Trial Court, in dismissing the First
of Action, disregarded the clear issues of fact ar
relating to the question of breach of contract l
respondent. The purpose of a Pre-Trial is to for1
the issues. As stated in 3 Moore, Federal Pract
Page 1116:

"It should be noted that the formulation
issues under Rule 16 is essentially a trima tter between the parties and the con:
rule providing that the Pre-Trial Ordei
limit the issues for trial to those not dispc
by admissions or agreements of counsel
court should not impose on the parties i1
views of what the issues are."
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, p1
for a Pre-Trial procedure and the formulation of
thereby. As is indicated in the last paragraph
rule, the court should make an Order which lim
issues to those not disposed of by admissions or
men ts.
8

In this case, there are many issues of fact and law,
and none of them were disposed of by any admissions
' or agreements of the parties.

,

,
'

'

There were factual issues relating to the question
of whether or not the State followed the provisions of
the specifications in testing and thereafter rejecting
the appellant's D-12 Hammer; there were factual
issues relating to the question of estoppel on the part
of the State to refuse to accept the D-12 Hammer;
there were factual issues relating to whether or not
the State had in fact agreed to the use of the hammer;
there were factual issues as to whether or not the State
had exceeded the specification provisions relating to
agreement as to the energy rating; and, there were
factual issues relating to the arbitrary and unreasonable action of the State in testing the D-12 Hammer,
and in the refusal to permit the use of the hammer even
before the test results were known, notwithstanding
the results of the test. All of these factual issues were
ignored by the Pre-Trial Order, and notwithstanding
the lack of evidence, exhibits or trial in any way of
these issues, the Court determined that the First Cause
of Action could be dismissed as a matter of law.
It is clear that the above matters are questions of
fact or mixed questions of law and fact and are, therefore, within the province of the trier of the fact. In
this case, the trier of the fact was a jury, and appellant
was denied a trial by jury.

9

Again, as stated in Moore, Federal Practice, Page
1117:

"It is fair to say that while parties should
normally be held to admissions carefully and solemnly made, on the other hand the Pre-Trial
Order must not be an inexorable decree. It is
defined to promote litigation on the merits, and
a Pre-Trial must not, of course, be used to
thwart its very objective."

This Pre-Trial Order has clearly eliminated the
main issues in the case. It certainly is contrary to the
intent of Rule 16.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS PRE-TRIAL
ORDER IN CONCLUDING FROM THE
ANS,VER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3,
SET NO. 2, THAT APPELLANT HAD
NOTHING TO SHO'V BY WAY OF ARBITRARINESS, EXCEPT THE CONTENTION THAT THE HAl\1.MER HAD BEEN
USED ON ANOTHER PROJECT.

An examination of the particular Interrogatories

(R. 146) and the Answer thereto, (R. 44, 45) indicates
the following question:
3. "What facts evidence proposed tests or suggestions did the plaintiff present to def en~ant
to show that plaintiff's Del Mag D-12 D1e.sel
Hammer, and possess the energy rating which
plaintiff claimed."
The answer to that interrogatory is, as follows:
10

3. "Nothing was presented at that particular
time, other than the fact that the defendant had
approved the use of another job and the fact
that the manufacturer had made this particular
rating."

The question and answer indicate clearly that no
arbitrariness or unreasonableness is being discussed or
even contemplateq. The question simply asks the plaintiff to tell what facts, evidence, proposed tests, or suggestions were presented to the defendant to demonstrate
the energy rating of the D-12 Hammer. The answer
given relates to the particular time of making the
test and indicates that two evidences of the energy rating
were stated, i.e., the prior approval of use on another
job, and the fact that the manufacturer had made
the rating. The arbitrariness involved in this First
Cause of Action has to do with many other facts than
with the actual rating of the hammer. The actions of
the State leading up to the test, the actions of the
State during the test, as well as the subsequent actions
of the State after the test in its disregard of the energy
rating, are facts relating to arbitrariness. Furthermore, the State admitted and recognized that the D-12
Hammer had a proper rating (R. 49), and further
recognized that the testing was not for the purpose
of determining the rating, but was made merely to
compare the appellant's D-12 Hammer with some other
hammer furnished by appellant's competitor (R. 55),
which latter hammer was in no way comparable to
appellant's hammer.

11

The Court misinterprets the interrogatory and
answer thereto in stating that the appellant "admits
it had nothing to show by way of arbitrariness ...
except that the hammer had been used on another job
by partners . . . " Obviously, the answer does not so :
admit, but it also states, and this the Court ignores,
that appellant informed respondent of the actual manufacturer's rating. The answer also limits the question to
the actual conducting of the test. In appellant's Motion
for Reconsideration, the facts leading up to the test
are set forth in Paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), (g),
(h), (i) and (j). (R. 74-77).
1.

The same Answers to Interrogatories indicate other
facts upon which the appellant relied to show the arbitrary actions of the State. It is not fair nor accurate
to isolate Answer No. 3 and give it the broad effect
which the trial court did to the complete disregard
of the other Answers to Interrogatories. The Inter·
rogatory and the Answer thereto upon which the trial
court relies simply has nothing to do with an admis·
sion as to lack of arbitrariness. It states simply that
at the time of the test, appellant informed respondent
that it had already used the hammer on a prior job,
which was accepted by the State, and that the rating
of the hammer complied with the specifications. As
appellant set forth in its Motion for Reconsideration,
the State was well aware of the problems relating to
the testing it was going to undertake and was well aware
of the inadequacies of this testing and of the fact that
it did not comply with the requirements of the speci·

12
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fieations. In no way can it be said that the appellant
admitted that the only evidence of arbitrariness was
the rating of the hammer and the fact that it was used
on the prior job.

C. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER ON THE
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
The Pre-Trial Court, in its Order, held:
"as a matter of law that the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover on the First Cause of Action." ( R. 71) .
This determination puts in issue the sufficiency of the
appellant's claims much in the same fashion as does
a Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, all of the allegations
of the Complaint and Amended Complaint must be
taken as true. The Court thus in effect states that the
First Cause of Action does not state a proper claim
against the defendant. This determination is in error.
The elements of the allegations should be considered
anJ are summarized, as follows:

ALLEGATIONS OF THE PLEADINGS
(a) That Harlin and the State entered into
the construction contract. (R. I).
( b) That the contract contained the following
G-eneral Condition:
13

"Combustion-type pile hammers may be used
in lieu of air or steam hammers, providing a rating (energy per blow) mutually agreed upon by
the Contractor and the Chief Structural Engineer is established prior to use."
The contract also contains the Special Provisions
that the minimum energy rating for a hammer shall
be 18,000-foot pounds per blow. (R. 9).
( c) That Harlin bid and was awarded the
contract in reliance upon said specifications and
upon using its D-12 combustion hammer, which
hammer had an energy ratnig of more than the
required 18,000-foot pounds per blow, i.e., 22,500
foot pounds per blow; and, that said hammer did
and would comply with specifications. (R. 9, 35).
(d) That the State breached the contract by
not fallowing the above specification, and deter·
mining the energy rating, but by adding another
test not provided for in the specifications, to-wit,
a test made to compare the driving ability of the
D-12 hammer with another type hammer, and by
requiring the driving ability of the D-12 hammer
with another type hammer, and by requiring the
plaintiff to use a combustion-type hammer with
an energy rating of 39,500-foot pounds per blow,
this exceeding the specification rating of 18,000·
foot pounds. (R. 2, 9).
( e) That the State further breached the con·
tract by arbitrarily, improperly, knowingly and

14

willfully disregarding the energy rating of the
D-12 Hammer and rejecting the hammer based
upon an inaccurate and inconclusive test which
neither determined the energy rating nor in any
way determined the capability or incapability of
the D-12 Hammer to meet the specifications, and
which test was initiated and carried out by appellant's competitor. (R. 9).
() f That Harlin also relied upon the fact
that the State had previously agreed to the 18,000
rating and to the use of the D-12 Hammer on
the subject project, in accordance with the said
General Condition; that Harlin had, therefore 1
complied with the specification, and that the State
had breached the specification by not permitting
the use of the D-12 Hammer.
(g) That in the absence of a specific agreement, the State was estopped to deny the use of
the hammer by reason of the fact that the same
hammer had been used and acceped upon the 21st
South project by the State immediately prior to
the letting of the subject contract under the same
General Conditions and Special Provisions, with
the same Chief Engineer for the State, upon a
similar project and with the Tolboe & Harlin
Construction Company, with which there was
privity down to the plaintiff and appellant herein;
and, that the State had knowingly maintained the
same General Conditions and Special Provisions,
15

and had known that the same hammer would be
used on the subject project.

I

i

(h) That the State had waived the require· :
ment that the used of the hammer be agreed to.
(R.2.9).
The foregoing allegations more than adequately
state a claim for a breach of contract by the State under
the following principles of law:

BREACH OF CONTRACT

The General Condition set forth in (b) above, :
permits use of the hammer, if the hammer has the ,
proper energy rating and if the rating is agreed to
by the State. The Special Provision modifies the General conditions and sets the minimum rating for the
hammer at 18,000-foot pounds per blow. The Contractor is entitled to rely upon this specification and
upon the conditions imposed therein governing the use
of the hammer, to-wit, the agreement as to the energy
rating. Although it certainly may be argued that the
Special Provision modifies the General Condition and
establishes the rating for purpose of the agreement
and in effect eliminates the necessity of an agreement,
except as to a determination of the actual rating of
the hammer itself. Wunderlich vs. United States, ex
rel Reischell-Cottrell, 240 Fed. 2d 20 ( C.C.A. Tenth).
Even though the specification is permissive, it is a
representation upon which the Contractor may rely.

I
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F. H. McGraw vs. United States, 82 Fed. Supp. 338;
and, Johnson vs. United States, 153 Fed. 2d 846.
Here, the State allegedly (R. 44) and admittedly
(R. 55, 142) was not testing the energy rating, but
was instead imposing another test-one of comparison
as to the ability of the two hammers to penetrate a
dense strata of ground. This was a condition outside
of the specifications and an attempt to impose into the
problem the Chief Engineer's opinion, thus constituting a clear breach of the contract.
In Midgley vs. Campbell Building Company, 38
Utah 293, 112 Pac. 820, this very question was before
our court. In that case, the contractor was required to
furnish goods "in each case in strict accordance with
the plans and specifications." However, the Architect
rejected the goods upon another basis. The court held
that this was arbitrary and was a breach of the contract,
and that the goods would have to be rejected for failure
to comply with the specifications, and not for failure
to comply with some other requirement.

In Davies vs. Kahn, 251 Fed. 2d 324, the court held
to the same effect and stated:
"Unless authorized by the contract, an Architect has no inherent power to insist on an article
of particular manufacture not specified in the
contract over one that in all respects responds
to the contract."
In United States vs. Adams, 160 Fed. Supp. 143,
358 Fed. 2d 986, the Government Inspector required

17

the Contractor to perform tests beyond those called for
in the specifications. The court recognized the right VJ
inspect, but held that:
"The inspections were arbitrary and not in
conformity with the procedures and requirements
as set forth in the agreed inspection plan."
Judgment was granted in favor of the contractor.
It is clear, therefore, that even without any arbitrariness on the part of the State, the deliberate use
of a test not required or provided for in the specifications and exceeding that set forth in the specifictions,
constitutes a breach of the contract as a matter of law.
Even in a case where the specifications do not establish
the criteria for determining the operative fiitness, our
court, in H ayrnore vs. LeviMon, 8 Utah 2d 66, 3~8
Pac. 2d 307, has held that:

"The better considered view, and the one we
adhere to, is that the party favored by such a pro·
vision has no arbitrary privilege of declining to
acknowledge satisfaction. . . . "

In Volume 3 of McBride & Wachtel, Government
Contracts, Law-Administration-Procedure, at Para·
graph 27.40, the writers state that:
"With respect to the impropriety of an in·
spection, a failure on the Government's part to
conduct an inspection or test in exact accorda~ce
with the contract specifications, makes that m·
spection unreasonable."
Numerous Armed Services Board of Contract Appeal
cases are cited in support thereof. See also New York

18

,1Iarket Gardners Association vs. United States, 43
Ct. Cls. 114; Heid Bros., Inc. vs. United States, 69
Ct. Cls. 704; and, Lamport Manufacturing Supply
Company vs. United States, 65 Ct. Cls. 579.
Therefore, allegations either of the arbitrary or
unreasonable refusal to agree, or allegations of the
imposition of different tests than those provided for
in the specifications are sufficient as a matter of law
for a proper cause of action. At the very least, the
allegations raise questionse of fact as to the arbitrary
or unreasonable actions of the State.

'i\T AIVER OF CONDITIONS
Obviously, the State can waive a condition of the
contract. Appellant has alleged such a waiver and such
an allegation alone or in conjunction with a claim of
estoppel is sufficient. See New York Market Gardners
Association v. U.S., supra; and McBride-Wachtel,
supra, Par. 27.40.
PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE STATE
There is an allegation that the State had agreed
upon and had accepted the use of the D-12 combustion
harruner. If there is a prior agreement, then, of course,
the State berached the contract by refusing to honor the
condition which has been complied with by the Contractor. Obviously, evidence should be taken in connection with such an allegation of a prior agreement.
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EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

Inasmuch as the Special Provisions establish a
minimum energy rating of 18,000-foot pounds per blow,
that Special Provision takes precedence over the General Condition which established the need for the parties
to agree upon a rating. H ollerback vs. United States,
233 U. S. 165; and, Erickson vs. United States, 107
Fed. 204 (C.C.A. 9th). It certainly is reasonable to
contend that no agreement was required. This contention is substantiated by the actual facts:
On the 21st South project, (R. 2, 10, 17 and 34)
there was no specific agreement signed. However, the
same D-12 hammer was used by the Contractor, wa~
accepted by and approved by the State throughout
the entire project, and in fact was accepted and approved by the State when the hammer was returned
to that 21st South project after it had been wrongfully
rejected on the subject 2_roject. (R. 65, 73-75, 78). As
further indication of the waiver of the express agree·
ment, appellant, when forced to obtain a new and larger
Del Mag combustion hammer, used it on the subject
job with the State's acceptance but without testing or
without specific agreement by the State prior to use.
Thus, the State, both under the allegations and under
the general facts which would be shown m support
thereof, had waived the requirement of an express
agreement.
However, in addition to the foregoing waiver and
in expansion thereof, the State, under the Doctrine of
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Equitable Estoppel, cannot deny the use of the D-12
combustion hammer. The State knew of the use and
the acceptance of the D-12 and its rating of 18,000-f'oot pounds per blow or more under the same
General Conditions and the same Special Provision
on the 21st South structure project. All conditions
were identical to the subject problem, excepting that
the contractor on the 21st South project was legally
a different entity, but practically the same. In any
event, there was privity between the Contractor on
the 21st South job and the Contractor on the subject
job through dissolution of the Tolboe & Harlin Construction Company partnership entity and transfer of
assets, including the D-12 hammer to appellant. (R.
73, 74, 83).
The general rule as developed in the dissent in
State vs. Northwest Magnesite Company, 182 Pac.
2d 543, is that:
"A Governmental agency may be estopped,
as right and justice may require, where the act
or contract relied on to create the estoppel was
within its corporate powers, although the method
of exercising the power was irregular or unauthorized." (Citing 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, par.
144).
The principle of equitable estoppel is followed in
l'tah and is enunciated in various cases, such as: Tanner
)is. Provo Reservoir Company, 76 Utah 335, 344; I.X.L.
Stores vs. Succe.r;s Markets, 98 Utah 160, 166; Kelly
vs. Rfrhards, 95 Utah 560; and, Union Tank Car Compa11.1; z1s. TVheat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101.
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The plaintiff-appellant herein can take advantagt
of this estoppel even though it is legally and technicalh
a different entity, since estoppel enures to the beneti.i
of those in privity. 19 Am. Jur., Page 809. But eve11
privity is unnecessary, if the one making the repre.
sentations knows or should have known that the othe1
party will rely thereon. 31 C.J.S., Paragraph 130.
The facts, as to whether or not the necessary elemenh
of estoppel exist are, of course, for the trier of the facts.
in this case the jury, to determine. Albers vs. fo
Angeles County, 398 Pac. 2d 129.
Many facts exist in support of the theory ol
estoppel, and the facts are set out in part in the Memo·
randa ( R. 83, 84 ) and in the J\ifotion for Reconsidera·
tion. (R. 73-75). However, the allegations are suffi·
cient and this issue, both as a matter of law and of fact.
should have been retained in the First Cause of Action.
Therefore, we can only conclude that the allega·
tions of the :First Cause of Action state a claim on
several different theories. The trial court in its Pre·
Trial Order and thereafter at the trial, summarily
disposed of the First Cause of Action without properly
taking into account the legal bases for the cause and
without considering many facts relating thereto. By
this summary disposition, the appellant was effective!~·
prevented from having his day in court. Under the law
and under the facts also as they would have been <le·
veloped, plaintiff was entitled at the very least to a trial
on the issues. Under the law cited above, howerer.
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appellant would have been entitled to a judgment of
liability against the State as a matter of law upon the
breach of contract theory.

D. THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE
CLAIMS OF ARBITRARINESS WERE
INSUFFICIENT.
The very statement of the holding indicates its
error. The arbitrary disregard of the specifications is
as a matter of law sufficient to permit recovery on
the part of the plaintiff-appellant. The cases cited above
clearly so hold.
Furthermore, the court's conclusion that the claims
were not sufficient as a matter of law are contradictory
to the statement of the claim in the Pre-Trial Order.
There is no evidence nor any legal basis for determining that the claim of arbitrariness is insufficient. The
Court only relies in some fashion upon the alleged
admission found in the answer to Interrogatory No.
3 of Set No. 2. However, such a reliance is so plainly
erroneous when the actual interrogatory and its answer
are read, that even that has no basis whatsoever as
an admisson. Furthermore, the State recognized (R.
55) that it was not concerned with the energy rating,
but only with comparing the D-12 with the Raymond
hammer. Thus, the answer to the interrogatory, which
nwrely states that the plaintiff-appellant informed the
State of the rating at the time of the test, does not
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limit the arbitrary action of the State, but instead,
adds to it. However, it is clear that other events leaa
up to the test, including meetings on June 3 and
again on June 7th. ( R. 73-81; letter of June 13, 1961'
from Harlin to the Project Engineer). The additionai
bases for arbitrariness are set forth in Answers to
Interrogatories furnished by the plaintiff-appellant:
( R. 44) in Aff ida vi ts by the plaintiff; ( R. 53, 54/
and in Answers to Interrogatories of the subject Set
No. 2. (R. 44, 45). Thus, at the very least, the Pre·i
Trial Court had before it many factual statemenh ~
·which precluded any determination as a matter of law
that the admission limited the arbitrariness claimed b:
plaintiff.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S .MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIOX
AND AMENDlVIENT OF THE PRE-TRIAL
ORDER.
After rece1vmg the aforesaid Pre-Trial Order.
appellant immediately filed a Motion for Reconsidera·
tion, setting out in considerable detail the different
facts and issues which substantiate the ultimate issues:
raised in the pleadings. The court's refusal to amenJ
the Pre-Trial Order resulted in manifest injustice ann
was contrary to the spirit and intent of Rule 16 con·
cerning the Pre-Trial Orders, and also Rule 15 relating
to the amendment of pleadings.
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The courts uniformly have considered the PreTrial Order Rules and the Amendment of Pleadings
Rule as related in the effectuating of justice in our
judicial system. Amendments to the pleadings and to
the Pre-Trial Orders are generally granted so that the
parties can go to trial on meritorious issues. Hancock
vs. Lulce, 46 U. 26, 38. Especially is this so where the
Pre-Trial Order does not reflect the contentions of
the parties. In Calvin vs. West Coast Power Company,
(Ore.) ( 1941 ) 2 F .R.D. 248, the court held:
""\Vhere the Pre-Trial Order does not properly
reflect the contention of the parties, it may be
set aside before the trial and a new conference
ordered."
Again, in King vs. Edward Hines Lumber Company, 68 Fed. Supp. 1019, 1021, the court stated:
"Permission has not been denied the counsel
in cases where Pre-Trial Conferences were held,
to change the form of an admission or even its
substance before the final crystalization of the
Pre-Trial Order.''
Here, our Pre-Trial Order, contrary to the usual
practice, gave no period within which the parties could
object thereto. Appellant had only one means to
attempt to amend the June 23rd Pre-Trial Order in
order to properly set out the issues, and that was its
Motion for Reconsideration, filed July 6. (R. 7381).
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In McDowall vs. Orr Felt & Blanket Comp1rnJ
146 Fed. 2<l 13G, the court, in reversing the refusal o:
the trial court to amend the pleadings in order to se·
up additional facts, considered Rules 15 and 16 a·
compatible, and stated:
"To permit the submission of the actual facb.
or what is contended to be the actual facts of tht
present controversy, is here required for a jus!
disposition of the case, and leave to amend sh~ula
have been grau ted."
Again, in the annotation at 22 A.L.R. 2d 613, the
annotator states:
"The courts manifest an inclination to gran\
or deny an amendment on a Pre-Trial Order
on much the same grounds and conditions m'
those influencing the granting or denial of mo·
tions to amend the pleadings."
In Maryland Casualty Company vs. Reichenmaker.
146 Fed. 2d 75, the court reversed the trial courb

refusal to permit the injection of new issues where the
parties had stipulated to a contrary fact situation. The
court therein held that the spirit of the exception to
Rule 16 concerning the modification of the Pre-Trial
Order at the trial to prevent manifest injustice, was
consistent with Rule 15 (a), providing that leaYe to
file amended pleadings would be freely given when'
justice so requires.
In our own court in Reich vs. Christopulous, 123
Utah 137, the issues at the trial exceeded those in the
Pre-Trial Order, and an amendment of the Pre-Trial
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Order was permitted. This court cited Rule 15, permitting amendment of the pleadings, and stated:
''It would be anomalous if the pleadings could
be so amended but the Pre-Trial Order could
not . . . the amendment was equivalent to an
amendment to conform to the evidence. The
trial court did that which was necessary and
proper to effectuate justice."
In Miles vs. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
158 Fed. 2d 326, the issue was whether the deceased
was an employee or not. The plaintiff had asked for
a jury, but had agreed to certain facts subject to
reserving the rights of each party to introduce additional
eYidence. The trial court was held to have improperly
denied these issues as a matter of law, but should have
proceeded to trial on the facts.
The Pre-Trial Court and Trial Court has thus
effectively prevented any amendments to the pleadings,
and turned the Pre-Trial into a summary judgment
proceeding without proper notice, or legal factual basis.
This has deprived appellant of a substantial right to
trial and is manifestly without justice.

POINT III.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF ITS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.
The issue of performance of a contract or compliance with the specifications is factual. The issue of
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arbitrariness is likewise factual. 13 Am. J ur. 2d, Pa 1
129, and 54 A.L.R. 1268. The existence of the elemen(1
of equitable estoppel also involves a determination 01
facts. Albers v. Los Anyeles County, supra.
It is true that at the time of the Pre-Trial Order,
a Demand for Jury had not been made, but it is alsu.
true that at the time plaintiff-appellant moved to amena
the Pre-Trial Order and to include the First Caust
of Action in the trial of the case, a Demand for Jur)
had been filed, and the case was to have been tried b)·i
a Jury.

Under Rule 38, Utah R1tles of Civil Procedure,
and under the many cases decided by this court, includ·.
ing James Manufacturing Company vs. Wilson, l.i1
Utah 2d 210, 390 Pac. 2d 127; Holland vs. Wiuon.
8 Utah 2d 11, 327 Pac. 2d 250; and Finlayson vi.
Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 Pac. 2d 491, a party is en·
titled to a jury trial.

In order to preserve the record and to give thi)
Appellate Court the facts upon which it could properly
and intelligently determine whether or not the plaintiff·
appellant had a proper claim, the appellant sought to
make a proffer of proof before the trial. This proffer
was denied and such denial is prejudicial to appellant,
and is substantial error. It has prevented appellanl
from properly presenting this appeal record.
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SUMMARY
Appellant Harlin, through the summary disposition of the First Cause of Action at the Pre-Trial stage,
the summary denial of the right to amend the PreTrial Order by the Pre-Trial Judge, the further denial
of the Trial Judge to permit amendment of the PreTrial Order, and the denial of the right to try the First
Cause of Action, together with the denial of the right
to make a proffer of proof, have resulted in extreme
and manifest injustice to appellant. Legally, as the
citations show, he has a good cause of action against
the defendant. Factually, he can support and prove
under the required burden of proof the allegations set
forth in his pleadings. It is, therefore, equitable and
just, as well as legally proper, for this Court to permit
a trial upon the issues in the First Cause of Action.
To this end, appellant respectfully requests that the
Orders of the Pre-Trial Judge and the Trial Judge
be reversed, that the proffer be allowed, and that the
First Cause of Action be set down for trial in the
District Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
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